Learning by imitation

Creative Commons License

Başçı E.

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC DYNAMICS & CONTROL, cilt.23, sa.9-10, ss.1569-1585, 1999 (SSCI) identifier identifier

  • Yayın Türü: Makale / Tam Makale
  • Cilt numarası: 23 Sayı: 9-10
  • Basım Tarihi: 1999
  • Doi Numarası: 10.1016/s0165-1889(98)00084-0
  • Dergi Adı: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC DYNAMICS & CONTROL
  • Derginin Tarandığı İndeksler: Social Sciences Citation Index (SSCI), Scopus
  • Sayfa Sayıları: ss.1569-1585
  • Anahtar Kelimeler: learning, imitation, dynamic optimization, classifier systems, Kiyotaki-Wright model of money, EXCHANGE, MONEY
  • TED Üniversitesi Adresli: Hayır

Özet

This paper introduces a learning algorithm that allows for imitation in recursive dynamic games. The Kiyotaki-Wright model of money is a well-known example of such decision environments. In this context, learning by experience has been studied before. Here, we introduce imitation as an additional channel for learning. In numerical simulations, we observe that the presence of imitation either speeds up social convergence to the theoretical Markov-Nash equilibrium or leads every agent of the same type to the same mode of suboptimal behavior. We observe an increase in the probability of convergence to equilibrium, as the incentives for optimal play become more pronounced. (C) 1999 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.