Swarming behavior as Nash equilibrium

Creative Commons License

Ozgüler A. B., Yıldız A.

3rd IFAC Workshop on Distributed Estimation and Control in Networked Systems, NECSYS 2012, Santa Barbara, CA, United States Of America, 14 - 15 September 2012, vol.45, pp.151-155 identifier

  • Publication Type: Conference Paper / Full Text
  • Volume: 45
  • Doi Number: 10.3182/20120914-2-us-4030.00046
  • City: Santa Barbara, CA
  • Country: United States Of America
  • Page Numbers: pp.151-155
  • Keywords: Dynamic game, Foraging, Game theory, Nash equilibrium, Swarm, Swarming behavior
  • TED University Affiliated: No

Abstract

The question of whether swarms can form as a result of a non-cooperative game played by individuals is shown here to have an affirmative answer. A dynamic game played by N agents in one-dimensional motion is introduced and models, for instance, a foraging ant colony. Each agent controls its velocity to minimize its total work done in a finite time interval. The game is shown to have a Nash equilibrium that has all the features of a swarm behavior. © 2012 IFAC.