Partially Informed Agents Can Form a Swarm in a Nash Equilibrium

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Yıldız A., Ozguler A. B.

IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON AUTOMATIC CONTROL, cilt.60, sa.11, ss.3089-3094, 2015 (SCI-Expanded) identifier identifier

  • Yayın Türü: Makale / Tam Makale
  • Cilt numarası: 60 Sayı: 11
  • Basım Tarihi: 2015
  • Doi Numarası: 10.1109/tac.2015.2411912
  • Dergi Adı: IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON AUTOMATIC CONTROL
  • Derginin Tarandığı İndeksler: Science Citation Index Expanded (SCI-EXPANDED), Scopus
  • Sayfa Sayıları: ss.3089-3094
  • Anahtar Kelimeler: Artificial potentials, dynamic game theory, dynamic multi-agent systems, finite horizon, Nash equilibrium, social foraging, swarming behavior, SYSTEMS, COMPLEXITY, STABILITY
  • TED Üniversitesi Adresli: Hayır

Özet

Foraging swarms in one-dimensional motion with incomplete position information are studied in the context of a noncooperative differential game. In this game, the swarming individuals act with partial information as it is assumed that each agent knows the positions of only the adjacent ones. It is shown that a Nash equilibrium solution that exhibits many features of a foraging swarm such as movement coordination, self-organization, stability, and formation control exists.