Swarming behavior as Nash equilibrium

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Ozgüler A. B., Yıldız A.

3rd IFAC Workshop on Distributed Estimation and Control in Networked Systems, NECSYS 2012, Santa Barbara, CA, Amerika Birleşik Devletleri, 14 - 15 Eylül 2012, cilt.45, ss.151-155, (Tam Metin Bildiri)

  • Yayın Türü: Bildiri / Tam Metin Bildiri
  • Cilt numarası: 45
  • Doi Numarası: 10.3182/20120914-2-us-4030.00046
  • Basıldığı Şehir: Santa Barbara, CA
  • Basıldığı Ülke: Amerika Birleşik Devletleri
  • Sayfa Sayıları: ss.151-155
  • Anahtar Kelimeler: Dynamic game, Foraging, Game theory, Nash equilibrium, Swarm, Swarming behavior
  • Açık Arşiv Koleksiyonu: AVESİS Açık Erişim Koleksiyonu
  • TED Üniversitesi Adresli: Hayır

Özet

The question of whether swarms can form as a result of a non-cooperative game played by individuals is shown here to have an affirmative answer. A dynamic game played by N agents in one-dimensional motion is introduced and models, for instance, a foraging ant colony. Each agent controls its velocity to minimize its total work done in a finite time interval. The game is shown to have a Nash equilibrium that has all the features of a swarm behavior. © 2012 IFAC.