3rd IFAC Workshop on Distributed Estimation and Control in Networked Systems, NECSYS 2012, Santa Barbara, CA, United States Of America, 14 - 15 September 2012, vol.45, pp.151-155
Conference Paper / Full Text
Santa Barbara, CA
United States Of America
Dynamic game, Foraging, Game theory, Nash equilibrium, Swarm, Swarming behavior
TED University Affiliated:
The question of whether swarms can form as a result of a non-cooperative game played by individuals is shown here to have an affirmative answer. A dynamic game played by N agents in one-dimensional motion is introduced and models, for instance, a foraging ant colony. Each agent controls its velocity to minimize its total work done in a finite time interval. The game is shown to have a Nash equilibrium that has all the features of a swarm behavior. © 2012 IFAC.