Foraging Swarms as Nash Equilibria of Dynamic Games
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON CYBERNETICS, cilt.44, sa.6, ss.979-987, 2014 (SCI-Expanded, Scopus)
- Yayın Türü: Makale / Tam Makale
- Cilt numarası: 44 Sayı: 6
- Basım Tarihi: 2014
- Doi Numarası: 10.1109/tcyb.2013.2283102
- Dergi Adı: IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON CYBERNETICS
- Derginin Tarandığı İndeksler: Science Citation Index Expanded (SCI-EXPANDED), Scopus
- Sayfa Sayıları: ss.979-987
- Anahtar Kelimeler: Artificial potentials, differential game, Hamilton-Jacobi, multiagent systems, Nash equilibrium, swarm, STABILITY ANALYSIS, ARTIFICIAL POTENTIALS, COOPERATIVE CONTROL
- Açık Arşiv Koleksiyonu: AVESİS Açık Erişim Koleksiyonu
- TED Üniversitesi Adresli: Hayır
Özet
The question of whether foraging swarms can form as a result of a noncooperative game played by individuals is shown here to have an affirmative answer. A dynamic game played by N agents in 1-D motion is introduced and models, for instance, a foraging ant colony. Each agent controls its velocity to minimize its total work done in a finite time interval. The game is shown to have a unique Nash equilibrium under two different foraging location specifications, and both equilibria display many features of a foraging swarm behavior observed in biological swarms. Explicit expressions are derived for pairwise distances between individuals of the swarm, swarm size, and swarm center location during foraging.