A decomposition of transferable utility games: structure of transferable utility games

Creative Commons License

Derya A. M.

TURKISH JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICS, cilt.39, sa.2, ss.200-211, 2015 (SCI-Expanded) identifier identifier

  • Yayın Türü: Makale / Tam Makale
  • Cilt numarası: 39 Sayı: 2
  • Basım Tarihi: 2015
  • Doi Numarası: 10.3906/mat-1404-56
  • Dergi Adı: TURKISH JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICS
  • Derginin Tarandığı İndeksler: Science Citation Index Expanded (SCI-EXPANDED), Scopus, TR DİZİN (ULAKBİM)
  • Sayfa Sayıları: ss.200-211
  • Anahtar Kelimeler: Transferable utility games, cooperative games, core, single-valued core, balanced collections
  • TED Üniversitesi Adresli: Hayır

Özet

We define a decomposition of transferable utility games based on shifting the worth of the grand coalition so that the associated game has a nonempty core. We classify the set of all transferable utility games based on that decomposition and analyze their structure. Using the decomposition and the notion of minimal balanced collections, we give a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for a transferable utility game to have a singleton core.