Preserving acquired rights in the re-placement of medical residents in Türkiye
Review of Economic Design, vol.30, no.2, pp.203-237, 2026 (SSCI, Scopus)
- Publication Type: Article / Article
- Volume: 30 Issue: 2
- Publication Date: 2026
- Doi Number: 10.1007/s10058-025-00392-2
- Journal Name: Review of Economic Design
- Journal Indexes: Social Sciences Citation Index (SSCI), Scopus, IBZ Online, ABI/INFORM, Business Source Elite, Business Source Premier, EconLit, zbMATH
- Page Numbers: pp.203-237
- Keywords: Acquired rights, Capacity constraints, Fairness, Many-to-one matching
- TED University Affiliated: Yes
Abstract
We analyze the re-placement mechanism implemented in Türkiye for reassigning doctors to residency programs after scoring errors were realized. By law, initial placements based on faulty scores are acquired rights, prohibiting re-placement to less favorable programs. This setup requires balancing fairness for doctors with improved rankings, preserving acquired rights, and adhering to program capacities. Our analysis focuses on the two-step serial dictatorship mechanism implemented by the Center for Assessment, Selection, and Placement (CASP) to address this problem. We show that the CASP mechanism violates fairness, such that higher-scoring doctors may justifiably envy the assignments of lower-scoring peers. Yet, when doctors adopt a weakly dominant strategy and truncate preferences below their initial placements, a more lenient notion of q-fairness is satisfied. Additionally, we show how manipulation incentives under the CASP mechanism lead to excessive deviations from target capacities. We propose the Acquired Rights Adjusted Serial Dictatorship (AR-SD) mechanism to prevent strategic manipulation and minimize deviations. Furthermore, we describe simple modifications to the CASP mechanism that render it equivalent to AR-SD. Finally, simulations using total deviations as a metric show that AR-SD consistently achieves fewer deviations than the CASP mechanism.