Akademik Veri Yönetim Sistemi
Review of Economic Design, 2025 (SSCI, Scopus)
We analyze the re-placement mechanism implemented in Türkiye for reassigning doctors to residency programs after scoring errors were realized. By law, initial placements based on faulty scores are acquired rights, prohibiting re-placement to less favorable programs. This setup requires balancing fairness for doctors with improved rankings, preserving acquired rights, and adhering to program capacities. Our analysis focuses on the two-step serial dictatorship mechanism implemented by the Center for Assessment, Selection, and Placement (CASP) to address this problem. We show that the CASP mechanism violates fairness, such that higher-scoring doctors may justifiably envy the assignments of lower-scoring peers. Yet, when doctors adopt a weakly dominant strategy and truncate preferences below their initial placements, a more lenient notion of q-fairness is satisfied. Additionally, we show how manipulation incentives under the CASP mechanism lead to excessive deviations from target capacities. We propose the Acquired Rights Adjusted Serial Dictatorship (AR-SD) mechanism to prevent strategic manipulation and minimize deviations. Furthermore, we describe simple modifications to the CASP mechanism that render it equivalent to AR-SD. Finally, simulations using total deviations as a metric show that AR-SD consistently achieves fewer deviations than the CASP mechanism.