Merge Proofness of Allocation Rules at Transferable Utility Games

Derya A. M.

IKTISAT ISLETME VE FINANS, cilt.29, sa.343, ss.71-82, 2014 (SSCI) identifier

  • Yayın Türü: Makale / Tam Makale
  • Cilt numarası: 29 Sayı: 343
  • Basım Tarihi: 2014
  • Doi Numarası: 10.3848/iif.2014.343.4224
  • Dergi Adı: IKTISAT ISLETME VE FINANS
  • Derginin Tarandığı İndeksler: Social Sciences Citation Index (SSCI)
  • Sayfa Sayıları: ss.71-82
  • Anahtar Kelimeler: Cooperative Games, Transferable Utility Games, Merge Proofness, Allocation Rules, COOPERATIVE GAMES, NETWORKS
  • TED Üniversitesi Adresli: Hayır

Özet

In this paper, different merge proof notions for allocation rules at transferable utility games are defined and studied. Merging of a coalition into a single player is considered mainly in two different ways: firstly, merging of only one coalition - where the other (external) players stay as singletons, in other words, stay as they are, which is the general approach in the literature-; and secondly, merging of any coalition - where the other (external) players can also merge. This paper includes relations between different merge proof definitions, some impossibility results on merging and some possibility results via convex combinations of allocation rules in transferable utility games.