Foraging motion of swarms with leaders as Nash equilibria

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Yıldız A., Ozguler A. B.

AUTOMATICA, cilt.73, ss.163-168, 2016 (SCI-Expanded) identifier identifier

  • Yayın Türü: Makale / Tam Makale
  • Cilt numarası: 73
  • Basım Tarihi: 2016
  • Doi Numarası: 10.1016/j.automatica.2016.07.024
  • Dergi Adı: AUTOMATICA
  • Derginin Tarandığı İndeksler: Science Citation Index Expanded (SCI-EXPANDED), Scopus
  • Sayfa Sayıları: ss.163-168
  • Anahtar Kelimeler: Leader-follower, Rendezvous problem, Ordered graph, Directed star, Nash equilibrium, Swarm, Foraging, Multi-agent systems, Differential game theory, FORMATION FLIGHT, OPTIMIZATION, PARTICLE, SAVINGS
  • TED Üniversitesi Adresli: Hayır

Özet

The consequences of having a leader in a swarm are investigated using differential game theory. We model foraging swarms with leader and followers as a non-cooperative, multi-agent differential game. The agents in the game start from a set of initial positions and migrate towards a target. The agents are assumed to have no desire, partial desire or full desire to reach the target. We consider two types of leadership structures, namely hierarchical leadership and a single leader. In both games, the type of leadership is assumed to be passive. We identify the realistic assumptions under which a unique Nash equilibrium exists in each game and derive the properties of the Nash solutions in detail. It is shown that having a passive leader economizes in the total information exchange at the expense of aggregation stability in a swarm. It turns out that, the leader is able to organize the non-identical followers into harmony under missing information. (C) 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.