Comparative International Education Society, California, Amerika Birleşik Devletleri, 28 Mart - 01 Nisan 2026, ss.159, (Özet Bildiri)
Introduction
More than a decade after the Syrian crisis began, the world continues to struggle with sustaining humanitarian and educational support for refugees. According to UNHCR (2021a), 13.4 million people in Syria need of assistance, including 6.7 million internally displaced and 6.6 million refugees abroad. Neighboring states, Türkiye, Jordan, and Lebanon, have carried a disproportionate responsibility, with Türkiye alone hosting 3.6 million Syrians (UNHCR, 2020, 2021b). While international actors highlight the “extraordinary generosity” of these host countries (UNHCR-Türkiye, 2021), such praise obscures the persistent inequities in global refugee governance.
Türkiye’s evolving refugee education policies offer a valuable case study of how national systems adapt under prolonged displacement. Previous research has traced three broad stages: emergency responses, separate provision through Temporary Education Centers(TECs), and integration into public schools (Brugha et al., 2021). However, drawing on longitudinal qualitative data collected between 2013 and 2023, this study argues that two additional stages have emerged. First, the Covid-19 pandemic exposed the fragility of integration and re-opened space for informal actors. Second, between 2021 and 2023, the growing influence of NGOs' societal curricula reshaped refugee communities’ cultural orientations and intensified their struggles with inclusion. Together, these phases suggest the need for a revised understanding of refugee education that accounts for resilience, autonomy, and the unintended consequences of policy shifts.
Legal and Policy Context
Before the influx of Syrians, Türkiye’s asylum framework was shaped by the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol but applied only to European asylum seekers (Arar et al., 2020; Brugha et al., 2021). Syrians were initially considered “guests” (Icduygu, 2015; Ihlamur-Öner, 2013), a framing that later gave way to longer-term strategies culminating in the 2014 Law on Foreigners and International Protection (LFIP). This legislation granted Syrians under temporary protection the right to access education, marking a turning point in refugee education governance. Yet, as Unutulmaz (2019) notes, the effectiveness of such policies has been shaped as much by local discourses and socio-political dynamics as by formal law. Crucially, NGO influence began shaping parallel educational opportunities during these years, laying the groundwork for the societal curricula that would later dominate refugee children’s learning (Author, 2023).
Methodology
The study draws on longitudinal qualitative data collected between 2013 and 2023 across schools, communities, and households. Fieldwork combined interviews, observations, and analysis of policy documents. The data were re-analyzed through a breadth-and-depth approach: surveying archived materials, thematic mapping, remapping overlapping stages, and conducting in-depth interpretive analysis.
Findings
Phase 1: Emergency and Laissez-Faire Responses (2011–2013)
In the early years, Türkiye assumed that Syrians would not remain permanently. Camp schools run by AFAD and the Turkish Red Crescent offered temporary solutions (Ay, 2014), while children outside camps were admitted informally into public schools without registration. Attendance was not monitored, and schooling lacked accreditation.
Phase 2: Separate and Community-Based Provision (2013–2016)
As displacement persisted, TECs and Syrian schools proliferated. These institutions provided Arabic-medium instruction based on a revised Syrian curriculum and were largely managed by Syrian educators and community organizations (Balkar et al., 2016; Kaya, 2019). While they maintained cultural continuity, they failed to develop Turkish proficiency and often reinforced divisions between Syrians and locals. Families preferred TECs to protect their children from discrimination in public schools, which limited long-term integration.
Phase 3: Integration into National Schools (2016–2019)
From 2016, integration policies gained momentum. With support from UNICEF and UNHCR, the PICTES project promoted access and cohesion (Gürsoy & Ertaşoğlu, 2019; Karsli-Calamak & Kilinc, 2019). Syrian children in public schools began receiving accredited diplomas and language instruction. However, challenges persisted: inadequate Turkish skills, trauma-related difficulties (Aydın & Kaya, 2020), and economic pressures that led to child labor (Author, 2019; Uyan-Semerci & Erdogan, 2018). Community resistance also intensified during this stage, as many families trusted NGO programs over formal schooling.
Phase 4: Pandemic Disruptions and the Rise of Informal Curricula (2020)
The Covid-19 pandemic disrupted formal schooling, leaving refugee children without reliable access to distance learning platforms like EBA. Refugee families’ lack of technology and internet widened the education gap. Informal NGOs and religious organizations stepped in, offering alternative educational and social programs. These “societal curricula” filled immediate gaps but also carried ideological, religious, and political content, reshaping children’s socialization in ways often misaligned with state integration goals (Bircan & Sunata, 2015).
Phase 5: Resistance and Cultural Consolidation (2021–2023)
By 2021, a new theme emerged: Syrian communities increasingly resisted inclusion due to structural barriers entrenched by both formal and informal NGOs. The rapid shifts in Türkiye’s education system, combined with the philosophical uncertainty of its integration policies, reinforced refugees’ reliance on alternative learning spaces. Children often remained loyal to practices learned at home and in NGO programs rather than in public schools (Author, 2023). Over time, this fostered a form of secluded community life, supported by NGO actors, in which Syrians developed a lifestyle combining elements of their former culture with new ideological orientations shaped by external organizations. What began as coping mechanisms evolved into a deliberate preference for sustaining cultural distance, with refugee families increasingly identifying NGO-led spaces as more supportive than local schools.
Conclusion and Discussion
Türkiye’s refugee education policies demonstrate both adaptability and vulnerability. While Brugha et al. (2021) identified three stages, this study proposes five: emergency responses, separate community-based schooling, integration into national institutions, pandemic-induced disruption, and NGO-driven societal curricula and cultural resistance.
The study underscore how inclusion policies, when implemented without addressing structural inequalities, may inadvertently reinforce exclusion. Refugee families’ growing loyalty to NGO-provided curricula highlights the unintended consequences of integration policies that reduce community agency while failing to resolve linguistic and socio-economic barriers (Author, 2023). Rather than dissolving cultural boundaries, the interplay between formal schools and informal NGO systems has produced parallel educational spheres, deepening resistance to assimilation and reshaping refugee identity formation.
A more sustainable model would involve balancing national integration policies with partial community autonomy, enabling refugees to contribute to educational solutions aligned with host country standards while preserving cultural continuity. Such an approach could reduce dependence on NGOs as surrogate providers, prevent the isolationist tendencies now visible in Syrian communities, and ensure resilience against future disruptions.